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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1954
a different conclusion, according to the court. Aside from the court's con-
fusing, although traditional, language2" it seems unfortunate that the
court ruled on the basis of what was clearly the driver's opinion of what he
would have done under different circumstances. It somehow sounds as if
the court has not told the whole story.2 9 Reasonable men could certainly
disagree on the result here, especially in light of the driver's additional
statement of opinion that had -the road roller been lighted, he might not
have pulled so far to the right and so might not have lost control. If the
court felt that the plaintiff simply had not carried the burden of proof or that
defendant really was not negligent, it should have said so. Proximate
cause is confused enough when understood.30
WALTER PROBERT
WILLS AND ESTATES
Right of Murderer to Take Property Exempt
From Administration
The question of whether a husband who had been adjudged guilty of
murdering his wife was entitled to $2500 set off to him in the inventory
of .the deceased wife's estate as property exempt from administration, was
presented to the Ohio Supreme Court in Bauman v. Hogue.' The court
held that the provisions of the statute2 prohibiting a convicted murderer
from taking any part of the estate of the victim applied to a surviving
spouse's statutory right to take property exempt from administration, 3 and
' There is no doubt that the road roller was a contributing cause to the collision. The
more realistic question is: to what extent did its obscurity unreasonably increase 'the
risk of the collision?
Perhaps the court did not believe the driver's story about the oncoming car, for
instance.
0Two other negligence cases worthy of brief mention are:
1. Connelly v. U.S. Steel Co., 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954). The
plaintiff was employed by a railroad company. While spotting cars on the defen-
dan's premises, plaintiff was negligently kicked in the face by one of defendant's
employees. Plaintiff took $250.00 from his employer and gave a release without
reserving a right to sue the defendant. Held that defendant and the railroad were
concurrent tortfeasors and a release to one was a release to both.
2. Cox v. Cartwright, 69 Ohio App. 245,121 N.E.2d 673 (1953). It is here
held that actions for negligence against dentists must be brought within one year
rather than six years from the time the cause of action arises.
Outside the area of negligence:
In Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213, 116 N.E.2d 819(Cuyahoga Com. P1. 1953) it was held not an invasion of the plaintiff's right of
privacy for the defendant to monitor plaintiff's telephone calls to determine if plain-
tiff was using a non-business telephone for business purposes.
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therefore the husband was not entitled to the $2500 set off to him m the
inventory of the deceased wife's estate.
Determination of Heirship - Applicability of Presumed
Decedent's Act in Estate of Actual Decedent
In Baker v. Meyers,4 -the Ohio Supreme Court stated that in a proceeding
to determine heirship 5 in the estate of an actual decedent, the provisions of
the Presumed Decedents' Act" are not applicable in presumptively fixing
the date of the death of one who if living would have the right to participate
in the estate of the actual decedent. It was therefore held -that in the ab-
sence of evidence that ,the decedent's aunt, who disappeared in 1927 and
had not been heard from since, survived her nephew, who died after the
aunt's disappearance, the aunt's husband was not entitled to participate in
the deceased nephew's estate, as -the surviving spouse of the aunt, who
would have inherited the nephew's estate had she survived her nephew.
Husband Primarily Liable for Expenses of
Wife's Last Illness
In In re SheWld's Estate' the children of the decedent excepted to certain
claims listed in the schedule of debts. The disputed claims consisted of
doctor and hospital bills incurred during decedent's last illness and the
claim of the surviving spouse of the decedent for reimbursement for pay-
ment to the hospital. The court held the expenses of -the wife's last illness
are primarily -the responsibility of the surviving husband and cannot be
charged against the deceased wife's estate. The court distinguished the
present case from that of McClellan v. Filson,8 in which case the estate of
the decedent was held primarily responsible, on the ground that in the Mc-
Clellan case the surviving husband did not contract the indebtedness, and
that in fact the creditors 'had looked to the decedenes separate estate at the
tme they were engaged.
1 160 Ohio St. 296, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953)
OHIO REv. CODE § 2105.19.
'OHIo REv. CODE § 2115.13.
'160 Ohio St. 376, 116 N.E.2d 711 (1954).
'OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2123.01 et seq.
'OHio REv. CODE S§ 2121.01 et seq.
1116 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1953).
'44 Ohio St. 184, 5 N.E. 861 (1886).
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"Half and Half Statute"
Another part of the 'half and half" puzzle was put in place by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Millar v. MountcastleO which involved a stock dividend.
In 1939 a wife received 1350 shares of stock by the will of her husband. In
1948 she received a stock dividend of 2700 shares of stock. In 1951 she
died intestate and without issue, possessed of the above 4050 shares of
stock. In reversing the court of appeals10 and affirming the probate court
it was held that -under the "half and -half" statute,"1 which provides for the
descent of property when a relict dies intestate and without issue possessed
of identical property which came to the relict from a deceased spouse, the
total 4050 shares of stock were identical property and pass under the "half
and half" statute.
After-born Child - Declaration of Intent to
Disinherit in Express Terms Not Necessary
In Speldenner v. Speldenner,2 a testator devised all of his property
to his " wife absolutely and in fee simple." At the time of the
execution of the will, testator was the father of six living children and
was aware of -the fact .that his wife was pregnant with the seventh child.
Testator died thirty-eight days after the execution of the will, and the seventh
child was born shortly after the testator's death. Held, under Ohio statute13
which provides for afterborn chilren " unless it appears by such will
that it was the intention of the -testator to disinherit such pretermitted
child or heir ," a testator's intention to disinherit an after-born child
need not be declared in express .terms, but may be drawn from -the language
of the will in connection with the facts and circumstances surrounding the
-testator when -the will was made. In the present case, an intent to disinherit
the after-born child is implied from the language of the will when construed
in connection with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will, and the after-born child has no interest in the estate. A clear,
well-written opinion based upon sound reasoning.
Presentation of Creditors' Claims
Under the Ohio statute 4 requiring claims against the estate of a decedent
160 Ohio St. 409, 119 N.E.2d 626 (1954).
a 114 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio App. 1953); reported in Survey of Ohio Law 1953, 5
WEsT. RES. L. REv. 221, 321 (1954).
tOHIo REv. CODE § 2105.10.
"122 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio Prob. 1954).
"OnrO REv. CODE § 2107.34.
"OFo REV. CODE S 2117.06.
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to be presented to the executor or administrator in writing within four
months after appointment, it was held in Beacon Mutual Indemnay Co. v.
Stalder,15 that presentation must be to the representative in his capacity as
an officer of the probate court, and the function of that office cannot be
delegated to an agent. Consequently, the presentation of a claim to the
agent of an insurance company, even though appointed by the representa-
tive as the respresentative's agent, does not satisfy the statute, and the claim
becomes barred at the end of the time fixed by statute, unless otherwise
properly presented.
Payment of Proceeds of Deceased Veteran's Disability
Pension to State for Support of Veteran
In State Department of Public Welfare v Wendt,"0 a mentally disabled
veteran was hospitalized in a state mental hospital and died there. At his
decease, he 'had no money or property other than $1,520.85 accrued Federal
disability pension, which had been deposited by the Veteran's Administra-
tion during the period of his hospitalization in its "Fund Due Incompetent
Beneficiaries" account. This sum was turned over to the administrator of
the deceased's estate. The Department of Public Welfare presented to the
administrator a claim for the support of the deceased while confined in
the state hospital. The cla-i was allowed, but the administrator contended
that he had no funds available for.the payment thereof, maintaining that the
funds in his possession were exempt under the provisions of Federal law, 7
which, mnter alia, provides ,that
payments of benefits due or to become due shall not be assignable, and
such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary under any of the
laws relating to veterans shall be exempt from the claims of credi-
tors
Held, the exemption provided does not extend to the protection of the
heirs or next of kin of the pensioner, as against the rights of -the pensioner's
creditors. The fund held by the administrator should be administered as
other assets and distributed under -the intestate laws of Ohio. The adminis-
trator is required, therefore to pay the state's claim out of such fund.
Implied Revocation of Will by Divorce
In Younker v. Johnson,"8 the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a
husband executed a will during marriage leaving one-half of his property
120 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio App. 1954)
"94 Ohio App. 440, 116 N.E.2d 30 (1953)
T54 Stat. 1195, 38 U.S.C. § 454a.
160 Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954).
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to his wife, and a divorce decree which included a settlement of property
rights was thereafter obtained by the wife, there was, as to -the legacies and
devises to the divorced wife, an implied revocation of the will.
In Sutton v. Bethell,19 testatrix in 1943 made a will in which she named
her husband sole beneficiary. In 1951 her husband filed an action for divorce
against her, and while that action was pending -they entered into a separation
agreement. Subsequently, the husband was granted a divorce, and -the
separation'agreement was made a part of the decree. By this agreement,
the husband transferred all his interest in the household furniture and cer-
tain real estate to his wife, and agreed to pay her ten dollars per week during
the pendency of the divorce action. Ihe husband received nothing by the
separation agreement. The agreement expressly provided for the right of
each party to dispose of his or her own property by will, but made 'no
mention of any existing will. The wife died eight months and eight days
after the separation agreement was signed. Held, the will was not revoked
by amplication of law. The decision stresses the fact that the only transfer
6f property effected by the separation agreement was from husband to wife,
and the only apparent effect of her will would be to return to him the
property that was'his before the agreement; the right of each party freely to
dispose of his property by will, which was expressly declared by the agree-
ment, and die.'fact that the agreement made no reference to the will and did
not indicate any intent on the wife's part to revoke it.
Joint and Survivorship Bank Accounts
In In re Estate of Jones,2° the decedent created joint and survivorship
bank accounts,.naming Lee Hamilton, her nephew, as the joint owner. In
additton, the deceased and Lee Hamilton and his wife entered into an agree-
ment to the effect that Lee Hamilton should pay all of the decedent's bills
and funeral expenses and care for her until her death, and whatever was not
needed for such purposes was to go to the Hainiltons as compensation for
their services in caring for the decedent. Held, -the agreement was not
testamentary. The interest of the Hamiltons in the accounts was the result
of their contract to perform services for -the deceased, which services were
to be performed, with the exception of the funeral expenses, during the
deceased's lifetime. The result of'the contract would be a debt due the Hamil-
tons for servaces to be paid out of the joint accounts. It is not claimed that
they were to be beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased upon her death.
116 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio App. 1953).
"122 N.Y.2d 111 (Ohio App. 1952).
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Husband's Estate Only Secondarily Liable
for State Aid Furnished Wife
In Hausser v. Ebtnger,21 the executor of the estate of the wife brought
an action for a declaratory judgment against the executor of the husband's
estate ,to determine which estate was ultimately liable to repay moneys ad-
vanced by the State of Ohio to the wife as aid for the aged for necessary
living expenses during the marriage. The husband and the wife were
unable .to support themselves or each other. Simultaneously, they in-
dividually applied for aid. Each of the estates has sufficient funds .to reim-
burse the state for the assistance given to each of them. The plaintiff claims
that the husband's estate is liable not only for the aid -furnished .the husband
upon his own application, but is liable also for the aid -furnished to the
wife, on the theory that it was the husband's duty to support the wife and to
exonerate her estate for aid given in lieu of his furnishing such support.
The court of common pleas 'held that the plaintiff, as executor of the
wife, had no claim for reimbursement from 'the estate of the husband. The
court of appeals affirmed, and the executor of the wife's estate appealed.
Held, under Revised Code Section 5105.13, which provides in part that
"Upon the death of a person the total amount of aid paid .to said person, his
spouse, or either or both of them shall be a preferred claim against the
estate of -the deceased "the statutory obligation of the estate of the hus-
band to reimburse the state for aid paid to his wife was in he nature of a
secondary, or suretyship, liability, the primary liability for aid to the wife
resting upon her estate. The court further stated that since the 'husband
was unable to support himself, by statute2 2 it became the wife's duty to sup-
port herself and her husband, if necessary, and by her personal contract with
the Division of Aid for the Aged she contracted at least as to her own neces-
sites, and in the absence of an agreement for reimbursement, she was not
entitled to reimbursement from her husband or his estate for money or
property contributed by her for family use, for her assets applied with
her consent to the maintenance of the family, or for expenditures voluntarily
made by her. Judgment affirmed.
Devise Adeemed by Guardian's Sale of Realty
In Roderck v. Fisher,23 testator by the second item of his will devised
an undivided one-half interest in certain real property to his wife. By the
fourth item of his will, he gave .the remainder of his property in trust for
the maintenance and support of his wife for life and 'the remainder to
-' 161 Ohio St. 192, 118 N.E.2d 522 (1954).
'OHio Rav. CODE §§ 3103.01, 3103.03.
1 122 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio App. 1954)
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